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The effect of articulatory suppression on implicit and
explicit false memory in the DRM paradigm
Ilse Van Damme, Jan Menten, and Ge´ry d’Ydewalle
University of Leuven, Belgium
Several studies have shown that reliable implicit false memory can be obtained in the DRM paradigm.
There has been considerable debate, however, about whether or not conscious activation of critical lures
during study is a necessary condition for this. Recent findings have revealed that articulatory suppression
prevents subsequent false priming in an anagram task (Lo¨vde´n & Johansson, 2003). The present
experiment sought to replicate and extend these findings to an implicit word stem completion task, and
to additionally investigate the effect of articulatory suppression on explicit false memory. Results showed
an inhibitory effect of articulatory suppression on veridical memory, as well as on implicit false memory,
whereas the level of explicit false memory was heightened. This suggests that articulatory suppression did
not merely eliminate conscious lure activation, but had a more general capacity-delimiting effect. The
drop in veridical memory can be attributed to diminished encoding of item-specific information.
Superficial encoding also limited the spreading of semantic activation during study, which inhibited later
false priming. In addition, the lack of item-specific and phenomenological details caused impaired source
monitoring at test, resulting in heightened explicit false memory.
Keywords: DRM paradigm; Implicit memory; Explicit memory; Articulatory suppression; Divided attention.
The ‘‘DRM’’ paradigm (Deese, 1959; Roediger &
McDermott, 1995) is a widely used research
method to investigate the occurrence of false
memories in the laboratory. Participants are asked
to study lists of words (e.g., bed, rest, awake, tired,
dream, night, etc.), which are all semantically
related to a critical, but non-presented, lure
word (e.g., sleep). In subsequent tests of memory,
they erroneously identify the critical lure word as
if it was presented: Both false recall and false
recognition have been shown to occur at remark-
ably high rates, with probabilities similar to the
probability of recalling/recognising presented list
words (see Gallo, 2006, for a review).
Explanations are typically provided by two
main theories. First, according to the ‘‘activation-
monitoring’’ account (Roediger & McDermott,
1995, 2000), critical lures may be mentally acti-
vated during study (i.e., as an implicit associative
response or ‘‘IAR’’; Underwood, 1965), either
through the unconscious spreading of activation
or coming to mind consciously. On a subseq-
uent memory test, participants are confronted
with a source-monitoring problem (see Johnson,
Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), in which they need
to distinguish between items that were actually
studied and items that were merely mentally
activated during study. Confusion regarding the
origin of the items (i.e., source confusion) may
lead them to mistakenly recollect the critical
lure as being part of the study list, creating a
false memory. Second, according to the ‘‘fuzzy-
trace’’ theory (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 1998,
2002), illusory memories arise because of their
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consistency with the ‘‘gist’’ of the study lists. Both
‘‘verbatim’’ traces and ‘‘gist’’ traces are stored in
parallel during the study phase. Whereas the
former preserve specific information about
the identity of each item, the latter capture the
general meaning and interpretations invoked by
the studied information. In the DRM paradigm
strong gist traces will be formed, because of the
high levels of semantic overlap between the list
words. At test, the retrieval of gist traces may
generate meaning-consistent intrusions and false
alarms. The retrieval of verbatim traces, on the
other hand, can inhibit false memory through
‘‘recollection rejection’’.
Although the majority of DRM studies have
focused on explicit memory tasks such as free
recall and old/new recognition, implicit memory
tests have recently also attracted the interest of
false memory researchers. Implicit memory differs
from explicit memory in that there is no reference
to past learning, and therefore it reflects automatic
rather than controlled retrieval of information
from the study phase (Graf & Schacter, 1985). By
now, several studies have convincingly shown that
implicit false memory, or priming for non-studied
critical lure words, can be obtained in the DRM
paradigm (McDermott, 1997; McKone & Murphy,
2000; Smith, Gerkens, Pierce, & Choi, 2002; Tajika,
Neumann, Hamajima, & Iwahara, 2005; Tse &
Neely, 2005; Van Damme & d’Ydewalle, 2009a;
however, see also Hicks & Starns, 2005; McBride,
Coane, & Raulerson, 2006; Zeelenberg & Pecher,
2002). One of the oldest and most well known
implicit memory tests is word stem completion
(e.g., Graf, Squire, & Mandler, 1984). In such a test,
participants are presented with three letters and
asked to produce the first word that comes to mind
beginning with these letters. When target words
were studied in a preceding experimental phase,
the chances of these being generated at test are
significantly greater than in a control condition in
which they were not studied. This facilitation effect
is generally referred to as ‘‘priming’’. In a DRM
word stem completion task, false priming reflects
the enhanced tendency to complete stems to
critical lures related to studied lists, as compared
to the baseline completion rate for lures related to
non-studied lists.
Whereas veridical priming merely requires
adequate encoding of the to-be-studied list words,
false priming can occur only if the semantic
relationships between the study words are prop-
erly encoded. There has been some debate,
however, about the way in which this relational
encoding (cf. Hunt & Einstein, 1981; Hunt &
McDaniel, 1993) occurs. In line with the activa-
tion-monitoring account, several authors have
claimed that conscious activation of the critical
lure word is required to obtain implicit false
memory.1 McDermott (1997), for instance, found
priming for critical lures in word stem and word
fragment completion tasks (see also McKone &
Murphy, 2000), and argued that*as such tests
only show priming following lexical activation of
the words involved*implicit false memory
should be attributed to conscious activation of
critical lures during study. Meade, Watson, Ba-
lota, and Roediger (2007) demonstrated that
purely automatic activation processes in the
DRM paradigm are only short-lived, and rea-
soned that findings of significant implicit false
memory must therefore be due to repetition
priming (rather than semantic priming), elicited
by conscious activation of the lures during study.
Dewhurst, Barry, and Holmes (2005), on the
other hand, found that conscious generation of
associations during the study phase only affected
later false ‘‘Remember’’ responses, but did not
affect later false ‘‘Know’’ responses (procedure cf.
Tulving, 1985). According to the authors, this
suggests that covert verbal responses are required
to remember specific study details, whereas the
automatic spreading of activation is sufficient to
just ‘‘know’’ that the word was studied (see also
Kawasaki & Yama, 2006). Accordingly, Van
Damme and d’Ydewalle (2010) recently obtained
evidence that conscious lure generation does
indeed contribute to explicit false memory, but
does not show any association with implicit false
memory, both in amnesic patients and in healthy
controls.
In order to directly investigate the necessity of
conscious lure activation for priming of critical
lures, Lo¨vde´n and Johansson (2003) used articu-
latory suppression during the study phase and
subsequently tested memory by means of an
(implicit) anagram task. They reasoned that, if
covert verbal responses contribute to implicit false
memory, suppression would interfere with these
verbal responses, and the false priming effect
would be reduced. Participants were asked to
continuously utter the irrelevant word ‘‘Coca-
Cola’’ while studying DRM word lists. Afterwards,
they were to solve anagrams corresponding to
1 However, it should be noted that according to activation-
monitoring theory, both conscious and unconscious lure
activation are considered likely.
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both studied words and critical lures, and to rate
how difficult each anagram would seem to other
participants. The same findings were obtained for
both measures: Articulatory suppression resulted
in non-significant levels of false priming. The
authors therefore concluded that conscious acti-
vation of the lures is crucial to obtain reliable
degrees of implicit false memory. However, they
also noted that ‘‘it is conceivable that the suppres-
sion task had a more global capacity-delimiting
effect’’ (p. 728), as it clearly divided attention
during study.
The present experiment sought to replicate
and extend Lo¨vde´n and Johansson’s (2003) find-
ings to a word stem completion task. The effect of
articulatory suppression on explicit false memory
was also examined, in order to further clarify the
role of conscious lure activation. On the one
hand, several studies have provided evidence for
an association between the generation of critical
lures and an increased likelihood of false recall/
recognition (e.g., Goodwin, Meissner, & Ericsson,
2001; Marsh & Bower, 2004). Hence, if preven-
tion of conscious lure activation was the (only)
underlying factor inhibiting implicit false memory
in Lo¨vde´n and Johansson, articulatory suppres-
sion should also be expected to inhibit explicit
false memory. On the other hand, if a more global
factor, such as divided attention, was responsible
for the effect, an increase in explicit false memory
with articulatory suppression should rather be
expected: Pe´rez-Mata, Read, and Diges (2002)
provided evidence that false recall increases when
attention is divided with secondary task perform-
ance during study (see also Dewhurst et al., 2005;
Dewhurst, Barry, Swannell, Holmes, & Bathurst,
2007). Importantly, their results suggested that
the secondary task did not necessarily reduce the
(conscious or unconscious) elicitation of associa-
tive responses, but rather prevented participants
from encoding, monitoring, or identifying the
cognitive processes and phenomenological ex-
periences accompanying such associations. This
reduction in distinctive, item-specific, and phe-
nomenological information then complicated the
discrimination of presented and non-presented
items at test, leading to an increase in false recall.
In other words, diminished recollection of item-
specific information prevented the adequate
monitoring (or recollection rejection) of partici-
pants’ responses. In the present experiment a
cued-recall test was adopted, so that the implicit
and explicit test would differ only with respect to
the retrieval instructions used.
METHOD
Participants
A total of 60 volunteers (27 female, 33 male) took
part in the experiment. They were all native
Dutch speakers and a majority of them were
(under)graduate students. Their age ranged from
20 to 42 years, with an average of 29. They were
tested individually.
Materials
Study lists. The materials used during the study
phase consisted of 18 word lists, of which 9 were
presented for study and 9 were used for
test construction (counterbalanced). Following
Roediger and McDermott (1995), each list was
composed of 15 strong associations to one critical,
non-presented, lure word. Words were selected
based on Dutch word association norms, and were
ordered by association frequency, with the strong-
est associations occurring first. Lists were taken
from Van Damme and d’Ydewalle (2009a; Exp. 2),
where they were created so they would meet the
requirements for use with stem completion tasks
(cf. McKone & Murphy, 2000). This implied that
all critical lures and ‘‘list targets’’ were at least five
letters long, and had distinct three-letter stems,
with at least eight different possible completions.
One word from each list was selected to be the
‘‘list target’’ (i.e., the to-be-tested study word).
This word was not allowed to appear in either the
first two or the last two positions of the list. List
targets were matched to critical lures on baseline
completion rate (M16% and 21%) and word
frequency (M116 and 117 occurrences per
million, with frequencies counting based on the
CELEX lexical database of Baayen, Piepenbrock,
& Gulikers, 1995).
To allow for counterbalancing of studied ver-
sus non-studied materials, the 18 word lists were
divided into two sets, roughly equated on four
dimensions: word frequency and baseline com-
pletion rate of the lures, the probability of false
recall, and the probability of false priming (as
obtained in Van Damme & d’Ydewalle, 2009a,
Exp. 1).
Test construction. Stem completion tests con-
tained 36 three-letter stems, presented in a
different random order for each participant.
The stems originated from 9 studied words
(i.e., list targets from the studied lists), 9 words
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that were semantically related to the studied
words (i.e., critical lures from the studied lists),
and 18 unstudied distractor words (i.e., 9 targets
and 9 lures from the non-studied set). The latter
were included to provide baseline scores, as well
as to disguise the relationship between study and
test phase and hence to reduce the chance of
explicit contamination for participants in the
implicit test condition (cf. McKone & Murphy,
2000).
Both study and test lists were visually pre-
sented, using black uppercase letters in the centre
of a computer screen. E-prime was used for the
presentation of all materials.
Design
Encoding condition (Full attention vs Divided
attention) and Type of test (Implicit vs Explicit)
were manipulated between-subjects, creating four
conditions to which participants were randomly
assigned (ensuring a group size of 15 people
each). List status (Studied vs Unstudied) was
varied within-subjects. In each condition, one set
of nine lists was used for study. The remaining set
of nine lists was not studied, but was used for
construction of the word stem completion test.
Each set was used equally often as studied and
non-studied material, counterbalanced over par-
ticipants and conditions. Within each set, the
order of the lists was held fixed.
The experiment comprised three phases. The
study phase involved the visual presentation of
nine word lists, which were subsequently tested in
a stem completion task with either explicit or
implicit test instructions. The final phase of the
experiment included a free recall test, followed by
some questions about the retrieval strategy used
during stem completion.
Procedure
Nine lists were visually presented, at a rate of
2 s per word. Lists were separated from each
other by a 5-s appearance of an asterisk. In both
encoding conditions, intentional learning instruc-
tions were administered to the participants. In
the divided attention condition, participants were
additionally asked to repeatedly say out loud the
word ‘‘Coca-Cola’’, at a rate of approximately 2
times per word (i.e., articulatory suppression; cf.
Lo¨vde´n & Johansson, 2003). After all lists had
been studied, instructions for the word stem
completion task appeared on the screen. Partici-
pants in the explicit test condition were informed
that some of the stems would be originating from
words they had seen during the study phase,
whereas other stems would not. They were asked
to complete stems only with words they remem-
bered having seen, or otherwise to leave the
stem blank. Participants in the implicit test
condition were simply asked to complete each
stem with the first word that came to mind.
Following McKone and Murphy (2000), it was
emphasised that the words used to complete the
stems could come from anywhere, as long as they
were provided as quickly as possible. Proper
names were not allowed, and participants were
told that it was acceptable to leave an item blank
if nothing popped into mind immediately. Stems
were presented one by one on the computer
screen, with the experimenter writing down all
responses.
After the stem completion task was finished, a
final free recall test was given: Participants were
asked to recall as many of the list words as they
could still remember. The main reason of provid-
ing this task was to give participants in the
implicit retrieval condition the opportunity to
explicitly retrieve the studied words (in order to
justify the intentional encoding instructions used),
and hence to show what they were able to
remember.
As a final stage of the experiment, participants
were told that the experimenter had some re-
maining questions about the stems they had
completed. Based on the memory strategies
questionnaire developed by McKone and Murphy
(2000), they were asked whether they deliberately
tried to complete the stems with words they
remembered from the study lists, or rather
completed the stems with whatever word popped
into their heads first. Of particular interest was
whether participants in the implicit test condition
would report using explicit retrieval. This was not
the case. All participants reported to have used
the strategy that was in line with the instructions
provided to them. At the end of the experiment
everyone was fully debriefed.
RESULTS
Stem completion data are presented in Table 1.
Memory scores were obtained by subtracting the
proportion of stems completed to targets/lures
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from non-studied lists (i.e., the baseline comple-
tion rate) from the proportion of stems completed
to targets/lures from studied lists (cf. McKone &
Murphy, 2000; Van Damme & d’Ydewalle,
2009a). Since free recall performance was con-
taminated by performance on the preceding stem
completion tests, analyses on these data are not
presented. The task’s main purpose was to justify
the intentional encoding instructions and to allow
participants in the implicit stem completion con-
dition to explicitly retrieve the studied informa-
tion. An alpha level of .05 was used for all
statistical tests.
Veridical memory for studied list words
A 2 (Encoding condition: Full vs Divided atten-
tion)2 (Test condition: Implicit vs Explicit)2
(List status: Studied vs Unstudied) mixed-factors
analysis of variance was carried out on the stem
completion rates for list targets. Significant main
effects of Test condition, F(1, 56)4.05, MSE
.02, p.049, h2p.07, and of List status, F(1,
56)63.22, MSE.03, pB.0001, h2p.53, were
qualified by a significant interaction, F(1, 56)
17.59, MSE.03, pB.0001, h2p.24. This
reflected the fact that veridical memory scores
(i.e., the difference between studied and unstud-
ied lists) were larger under explicit than under
implicit retrieval instructions. Simple main effects
revealed that this could be attributed to a
significant difference in stem completion rates
for studied lists, F(1, 56)19.92, pB.0001,
whereas there were no significant differences in
baseline completion rates for unstudied lists (see
Table 1). Hence, as could be expected, word
stems originating from studied lists were com-
pleted correctly more frequently in an explicit
than in an implicit memory test.
The interaction between List status and
Encoding condition was marginally significant,
F(1, 56)2.45, MSE.03, p.12, h2p.04,
pointing to higher veridical memory scores in
the full attention condition than in the divided
attention condition (see Table 1). Simple main
effects revealed that the effect of Encoding
condition was significant for stems originating
from studied lists, F(1, 56)4.98, p.03, but not
for the baseline completion rate for unstudied
lists (FB1). Hence, articulatory suppression in-
hibited correct completion of word stems from
studied lists (regardless of the type of retrieval
instructions). Due to this inhibition, implicit
memory for list targets was no longer significant
in the ‘‘suppressed’’ condition (M.05), t(56)
0.88, whereas it was significant in the full atten-
tion condition (M.17), t(56)2.88, p.006.
False memory for critical lure words
A 2 (Encoding condition)2 (Test condition)2
(List status) mixed-factors analysis of variance on
the stem completion rates for critical lures
revealed significant main effects of Test condi-
tion, F(1, 56)8.85, MSE.02, p.004, h2p
.14, and of List status, F(1, 56)91.08, MSE
.02, pB.0001, h2p.62, which were involved in a
significant two-way interaction, F(1, 56)42.93,
MSE.02, pB.0001, h2p.43. The three-way
interaction between Encoding condition, Test
condition, and List status was also significant,
F(1, 56)6.57, MSE.02, p.01, h2p.11.
TABLE 1
Proportions of stems correctly completed to list targets and critical lures, as a function of encoding condition, test condition, and list
status (with standard errors of the mean in parentheses)
Implicit test Explicit test
Studied Unstudied Memory Studied Unstudied Memory
List targets
Normal encoding .30 (.04) .13 (.03) .17 (.05) .47 (.05) .08 (.03) .39 (.06)
With suppression .21 (.05) .16 (.03) .05 (.07) .39 (.05) .07 (.02) .33 (.06)
Critical lures
Normal encoding .27 (.04) .12 (.04) .15 (.05) .44 (.05) .08 (.03) .36 (.07)
With suppression .20 (.03) .19 (.03) .01 (.05) .52 (.04) .04 (.02) .48 (.03)
Memory scores were obtained by subtracting the proportion of stems completed to targets/lures from unstudied lists (i.e., the
baseline completion rate) from the proportion of stems completed to targets/lures from studied lists.
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Generally, false memory scores (i.e., the differ-
ence between studied and unstudied lists) were
higher under explicit than under implicit retrieval
instructions. The effect was larger in the divided
attention condition than in the full attention
condition, however. This could be attributed to
the fact that articulatory suppression inhibited
implicit memory for critical lures, t(56)1.91,
p.06, while it enhanced explicit memory for
critical lures, t(56)1.71, p.09 (see Table 1).
Critically important, and in line with the expecta-
tions, planned comparisons confirmed that
implicit memory for critical lures was significant
only following regular encoding (M.15),
t(56)2.85, p.006, but not following ‘‘sup-
pressed’’ encoding (M.007), t(56)0.14. In
the divided attention condition, virtually no false
memories were obtained.
Summary
In accordance with the nature of the retrieval
instructions, word stems from studied lists were
completed correctly more frequently in the ex-
plicit than in the implicit test. Articulatory
suppression inhibited veridical memory, regard-
less of the test instructions used. It had opposite
effects on implicit and explicit false memory,
however: Whereas suppression during encoding
eliminated implicit false memory, it heightened
explicit false memory.
DISCUSSION
In the present experiment a word stem comple-
tion task was used to assess both implicit and
explicit memory following either regular or ‘‘sup-
pressed’’ encoding. Based on Lo¨vde´n and Johans-
son (2003), articulatory suppression was expected
to inhibit implicit false memory, and the results
supported this expectation: Suppression at study
effectively eliminated false memory in the
implicit stem completion task. With respect to
explicit false memory, however, different expec-
tations could be formulated based on the factor
supposed to be underlying the effect of articu-
latory suppression. On the one hand, if mere
prevention of conscious lure activation was the
underlying factor inhibiting implicit false mem-
ory, then articulatory suppression should also
inhibit explicit false memory: Several studies
have provided evidence for an association
between critical lure activation and the likelihood
of explicit false memory (e.g., Goodwin et al.,
2001; Marsh & Bower, 2004). However, if a more
global factor, such as divided attention, was
responsible for the effect, an increase in explicit
false memory with articulatory suppression
should be obtained: False recall has been shown
to increase with secondary task performance
(Pe´rez-Mata et al., 2002; see also Dewhurst
et al., 2005, 2007).
With respect to implicit false memory, Lo¨vde´n
and Johansson’s (2003) results were replicated and
extended to the word stem completion task:
Priming for critical lures was only significant
following regular encoding, but approximated
zero following ‘‘suppressed’’ encoding. In contrast
to Lo¨vde´n and Johansson, however, similar results
were obtained for implicit veridical memory:
Priming for list targets was also significant only
following regular encoding, but not following
‘‘suppressed’’ encoding. This points to the conclu-
sion that articulatory suppression did not just
eliminate conscious lure activation, but hindered
encoding in a more general way. It also suggests
that, in word stem completion, priming for studied
words is (at least partly) based on conceptual
processes: Purely perceptual implicit tests are
generally unaffected by manipulations of divided
attention during the study phase (e.g., Mulligan,
1998). Our finding is consistent with previous
research showing that word stem completion is
not a regular perceptual test, but also has a
conceptual component (e.g., Brown & Mitchell,
1994; Carlesimo, 1994; Carlesimo et al., 1999;
Horton, Wilson, & Evans, 2001; Schwartz, 1989;
see also McKone, 2004).
Importantly, articulatory suppression produced
opposite effects on false memory under explicit
and implicit retrieval instructions: Whereas it
decreased false priming, it increased the level of
explicit false memory.2 The opposite nature of
these effects again strongly indicates that articu-
latory suppression did not merely eliminate con-
scious lure activation, but had a more general
capacity-delimiting effect: Continuously saying
‘‘Coca-Cola’’ during study can be seen as a
secondary task, causing divided attention. The
cued stem completion test used in the present
study behaved exactly like the free recall tests
used in previous studies. Pe´rez-Mata et al. (2002)
2 Considered separately, both effects were only marginally
significant, but the size of the interaction effect lends strong
support to their opposite nature.
ARTICULATORY SUPPRESSION AND FALSE MEMORY 827
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
KU
 L
eu
ve
n 
Bi
om
ed
ic
al
 L
ib
ra
ry
] 
At
: 
09
:0
1 
24
 N
ov
em
be
r 
20
10
showed that false recall is increased when parti-
cipants perform a secondary task during study. In
addition, using tasks similar to the one in the
present study (i.e., articulatory suppression and
random number generation), Dewhurst et al.
(2005, see also 2007) obtained an increase in false
recall, as well as an increasing number of ‘‘Know’’
judgements of critical items in an old/new recog-
nition task. In both studies, ‘‘Remember’’ judge-
ments of studied items as well as critical lures
decreased under secondary task conditions. The
latter also points to heightened uncertainty and
diminished recollection of phenomenological in-
formation associated with both studied items and
critical lures.
As argued by Pe´rez-Mata et al. (2002), the
effect on free recall suggests that the secondary
task prevented participants from encoding the
phenomenological information accompanying
both studied and associated items, as a result of
which monitoring was impaired: A reduction
in distinctive, item-specific information compli-
cated the discrimination of presented and non-
presented items at test, leading to an increase in
explicit false memory. The decrease in veridical
memory obtained in the present study could also
be attributed to problematic item-specific recol-
lection. However, to explain the decrease in
implicit false memory, an additional step in the
explanation is needed: As list words were pro-
cessed more superficially in the divided attention
or ‘‘suppressed encoding’’ condition, this most
likely inhibited the spreading of semantic activa-
tion from the list words to each other and to other
words/concepts in memory.
In sum, as attention is divided, words are
processed more superficially. This leads to im-
paired item-specific encoding (and therefore a
decrease in veridical memory), diminished spread-
ing of activation (and therefore a decrease in false
priming), and impaired monitoring of the
responses coming to mind during the test phase
(and therefore an increase in explicit false mem-
ory): When explicitly retrieving items based on the
cues provided, participants will be unable to
identify the source of the critical lures and to
judge them as non-studied. This can be framed
within both the activation-monitoring account and
fuzzy-trace theory: Suppressing gist-based false
memories through the recollection of verbatim
information on the one hand, and successful
source monitoring on the other hand can be
considered complementary or even identical
phenomena (see also Van Damme & d’Ydewalle,
2009b). It is not necessary, however, to call for the
presence/absence of conscious lure activation to
explain the differences between conditions. The
findings can entirely be attributed to superficial
encoding and therefore diminished spreading of
semantic activation. Hence, the present results
definitely do not speak against the assumption
that conscious lure activation is irrelevant
for implicit false memory (see Van Damme &
d’Ydewalle, 2010).
The above explanation emphasises the combi-
nation of diminished spreading of activation and
impaired source monitoring, both resulting from a
decrease in item-specific encoding. As argued by
Dewhurst et al. (2007), however, the increase in
explicit false memory might also reflect an
attempt to compensate for poor memory by a
shift in response criterion (e.g., Miller & Wolford,
1999). When participants perceive the study
phase as being more difficult, they might adopt
a more liberal response criterion during the test
phase. If a stem completion then comes to mind
that is related to one of the studied lists, they are
more inclined to use that item as a response.
Hence, the more liberal the criterion, the more
explicit false memories obtained. However, this
notion is difficult to reconcile with the fact that
explicit memory for studied words decreased with
articulatory suppression. As studied words also fit
within the themes of the lists, correct cued recall
should also increase with a more liberal response
criterion (although probably to a lesser extent), or
at the very least stay the same and not show a
decrease. Evidence for such reasoning has been
obtained by both Gallo, Roberts, and Seamon
(1997) and McDermott and Roediger (1998),
showing that lowering response criteria by warn-
ing participants about the nature of the task
affected hit rates as well as false alarm rates. In
other words, the fact that the present manipula-
tion produced opposite effects on veridical and
false cued-recall is difficult to explain solely in
terms of a shift in response criteria (see Roediger
& McDermott, 1999). A decrease in item-specific
encoding and therefore impaired source monitor-
ing, on the other hand, can explain both tenden-
cies. The secondary task (i.e., articulatory
suppression) prevented the encoding of both
item-specific and phenomenological information,
directly causing a decrease in (both implicit and
explicit) veridical memory. Due to the superficial
level of encoding, the spreading of semantic
activation in memory was also inhibited, which
eliminated false priming. In addition, the lack of
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item-specific and phenomenological details
caused impaired source monitoring, resulting in
heightened levels of explicit false memory.
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